Analyst's interest association research based on tripartite evolutionary game

As a key player in the capital market for information transmission, analysts should play an active role in improving the market information efficiency. However, driven by interests, analysts may issue research reports that are inconsistent with the facts. Analyst misconduct not only disrupts the market order but also may cause investors to suffer losses from both investment beliefs and asset values. By constructing an evolutionary game model of analysts, interest groups, and regulators, a quantitative characterization is made of the interaction process of the multi-party restraining forces of interest stakeholders, so as to work out the equilibrium point of the model, and a stability analysis and simulation analysis are conducted. It is found that: (1) the higher the cost of cooperation in violation, the smaller the benefit, the lower the probability of cooperation between analysts and interest groups, and the higher probability to loosen supervision on the part of regulators, and vice versa; (2) the time required for each party's strategy choice to reach equilibrium is related to the probability of the other two parties' strategy choices; (3) regulatory constraints are effective in combating market violations. This study quantitatively reveals the gaming process among analysts, interest groups, and regulators, and provides a quantitative basis for regulators to regulate and restrain the behavior of analysts and interest groups.